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Venus

75%

Previous versions

Process Quality Review (0.8)

Venus

Final score:75%
Date:26 Apr 2022
Audit Process:version 0.8
Author:Nick
PQR Score:75%

PASS

Protocol Website:https://venus.io

Security Incidents

Date:13 May 2022
Details: Some $14m of bad debt was accumulated due to an error in Chainlink's oracle configuration. This was a direct result of the UST crisis spiralling the price of Luna to 0, therefore is unforeseen. This was around 1% of their TVL, making it a minor hack. Users will be being repaid, as per the blogpost. We will not penalise Venus here as it does not appear that they are at fault since Chainlink set an arbitrary floor. A Chainlink representative blames Venus for not manually checking this before the bad debt was accumulated: https://twitter.com/ChainLinkGod/status/1525969014467403776
Reference Linklink

Scoring Appendix

The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.

The blockchain used by this protocol
BnB Smart Chain
#QuestionAnswer
100%
1.100%
2.100%
3.Yes
4.100%
5.100
94%
6.Yes
7.Yes
8.100%
9.60%
72%
10.80%
11.50%
12.Yes
13.100%
14.No
15.Yes
78%
16.90%
17.0%
57%
18.100%
19.0%
20.100%
21.0%
22.30%
23.80%
24.100%
25.100%
63%
26.50
27.No
28.Yes
Total:75%

Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.

  • Here is my smart contract on the blockchain
  • You can see it matches a software repository used to develop the code
  • Here is the documentation that explains what my smart contract does
  • Here are the tests I ran to verify my smart contract
  • Here are the audit(s) performed to review my code by third party experts

This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.

Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.

This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.

Smart Contracts & Team

100%

This section looks at the code deployed on the relevant chain that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.

1. Are the smart contract addresses easy to find? (%)

Answer: 100%

They can be found at https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-config , as indicated in the Appendix. This is quickly found via documentation.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Clearly labelled and on website, documents or repository, quick to find
70%
Clearly labelled and on website, docs or repo but takes a bit of looking
40%
Addresses in mainnet.json, in discord or sub graph, etc
20%
Address found but labeling not clear or easy to find
0%
Executing addresses could not be found

2. How active is the primary contract? (%)

Answer: 100%

Contract Unitroller is used substantially more than 10 times a day, as indicated in the Appendix.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
More than 10 transactions a day
70%
More than 10 transactions a week
40%
More than 10 transactions a month
10%
Less than 10 transactions a month
0%
No activity

3. Does the protocol have a public software repository? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

Location: https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol

Score Guidance:
Yes
There is a public software repository with the code at a minimum, but also normally test and scripts. Even if the repository was created just to hold the files and has just 1 transaction.
No
For teams with private repositories.

4. Is there a development history visible? (%)

Answer: 100%

At 360 commits, this development history has surpassed going to the moon and is currently orbiting Venus.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Any one of 100+ commits, 10+branches
70%
Any one of 70+ commits, 7+branches
50%
Any one of 50+ commits, 5+branches
30%
Any one of 30+ commits, 3+branches
0%
Less than 2 branches or less than 30 commits

5. Is the team public (not anonymous)?

Answer: 100

Public team members can be found in the GitHub repo as well as on the blog. They confirm working either on Venus or with Swipe, the team behind Venus.

Score Guidance:
100%
At least two names can be easily found in the protocol's website, documentation or medium. These are then confirmed by the personal websites of the individuals / their linkedin / twitter.
50%
At least one public name can be found to be working on the protocol.
0%
No public team members could be found.

Documentation

94%

The difference between this and the old link is solely the link.    This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.

6. Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

Location: https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol/blob/master/docs/VenusWhitepaper.pdf

7. Is the protocol's software architecture documented? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

This protocol's software architecture is documented in good detail.

Score Guidance:
Yes
The documents identify software architecture and contract interaction through any of the following: diagrams, arrows, specific reference to software functions or a written explanation on how smart contracts interact.
No
Protocols receive a "no" if none of these are included.

8. Does the software documentation fully cover the deployed contracts' source code? (%)

Answer: 100%

There is complete coverage of deployed contracts by software function documentation.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
All contracts and functions documented
80%
Only the major functions documented
79 - 1%
Estimate of the level of software documentation
0%
No software documentation

9. Is it possible to trace the documented software to its implementation in the protocol's source code? (%)

Answer: 60%

There is implicit traceability between software documentation and implemented code. Without direct links to code location in the GitHub repo, this link is associational.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Clear explicit traceability between code and documentation at a requirement level for all code
60%
Clear association between code and documents via non explicit traceability
40%
Documentation lists all the functions and describes their functions
0%
No connection between documentation and code

Testing

72%

10. Has the protocol tested their deployed code? (%)

Answer: 80%

Code examples are in the Appendix at the end of this report.. As per the SLOC, there is 113% testing to code (TtC).    This score is guided by the Test to Code ratio (TtC). Generally a good test to code ratio is over 100%. However, the reviewer's best judgement is the final deciding factor.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
TtC > 120% Both unit and system test visible
80%
TtC > 80% Both unit and system test visible
40%
TtC < 80% Some tests visible
0%
No tests obvious

11. How covered is the protocol's code? (%)

Answer: 50%

There is no documented testing for code coverage but with such a high TtC there is evidence of good test coverage.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Documented full coverage
99 - 51%
Value of test coverage from documented results
50%
No indication of code coverage but clearly there is a complete set of tests
30%
Some tests evident but not complete
0%
No test for coverage seen

12. Does the protocol provide scripts and instructions to run their tests? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

Scripts/Instructions location: https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol

Score Guidance:
Yes
Scripts and/or instructions to run tests are available in the testing suite
No
Scripts and/or instructions to run tests are not available in the testing suite

13. Is there a detailed report of the protocol's test results?(%)

Answer: 100%

Venus documents a test report. Link

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Detailed test report as described below
70%
GitHub code coverage report visible
0%
No test report evident

14. Has the protocol undergone Formal Verification? (Y/N)

Answer: No

This protocol has not undergone formal verification. While they mention they have done this in their documentation, the link they provide is dead.

Score Guidance:
Yes
Formal Verification was performed and the report is readily available
No
Formal Verification was not performed and/or the report is not readily available.

15. Were the smart contracts deployed to a testnet? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

Venus has documented a deployment to a testnet. These contracts can be verified using BSCScan's testnet feature.

Score Guidance:
Yes
Protocol has proved their tesnet usage by providing the addresses
No
Protocol has not proved their testnet usage by providing the addresses

Security

78%

This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.

16. Is the protocol sufficiently audited? (%)

Answer: 90%

Venus was audited once before deployment. The auditing firm was CertiK.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Multiple Audits performed before deployment and the audit findings are public and implemented or not required
90%
Single audit performed before deployment and audit findings are public and implemented or not required
70%
Audit(s) performed after deployment and no changes required. The Audit report is public.
65%
Code is forked from an already audited protocol and a changelog is provided explaining why forked code was used and what changes were made. This changelog must justify why the changes made do not affect the audit.
50%
Audit(s) performed after deployment and changes are needed but not implemented.
30%
Audit(s) performed are low-quality and do not indicate proper due diligence.
20%
No audit performed
0%
Audit Performed after deployment, existence is public, report is not public OR smart contract address' not found.
Deduct 25% if the audited code is not available for comparison.

17. Is the bounty value acceptably high (%)

Answer: 0%

Venus does not offer a bug bounty program.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Bounty is 10% TVL or at least $1M AND active program (see below)
90%
Bounty is 5% TVL or at least 500k AND active program
80%
Bounty is 5% TVL or at least 500k
70%
Bounty is 100k or over AND active program
60%
Bounty is 100k or over
50%
Bounty is 50k or over AND active program
40%
Bounty is 50k or over
20%
Bug bounty program bounty is less than 50k
0%
No bug bounty program offered / the bug bounty program is dead
An active program means that a third party (such as Immunefi) is actively driving hackers to the site. An inactive program would be static mentions on the docs.

Admin Controls

57%

This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.

18. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to find?

Answer: 100%

Admin control information was documented in the form of governance information at this location. This was quick to find.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Admin Controls are clearly labelled and on website, docs or repo, quick to find
70%
Admin Controls are clearly labelled and on website, docs or repo but takes a bit of looking
40%
Admin Control docs are in multiple places and not well labelled
20%
Admin Control docs are in multiple places and not labelled
0%
Admin Control information could not be found

19. Are relevant contracts clearly labelled as upgradeable or immutable? (%)

Answer: 0%

The relevant contracts are not identified as immutable / upgradeable.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Both the contract documentation and the smart contract code state that the code is not upgradeable or immutable.
80%
All Contracts are clearly labelled as upgradeable (or not)
50%
Code is immutable but not mentioned anywhere in the documentation
0%
Admin control information could not be found

20. Is the type of smart contract ownership clearly indicated? (%)

Answer: 100%

Ownership is clearly indicated in this location. It is in the hands of XVS holders who can vote / delegate their vote.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
The type of ownership is clearly indicated in their documentation. (OnlyOwner / MultiSig / etc)
50%
The type of ownership is indicated, but only in the code. (OnlyOwner / MultiSig / etc)
0%
Admin Control information could not be found

21. Are the protocol's smart contract change capabilities described? (%)

Answer: 0%

Smart contract change capabilities are not clearly identified in any contracts. While votes are specified as possible to occur, it is not clear what the votes parameters are.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
The documentation covers the capabilities for change for all smart contracts
50%
The documentation covers the capabilities for change in some, but not all contracts
0%
The documentation does not cover the capabilities for change in any contract

22. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to understand? (%)

Answer: 30%

This information is in completely software specific language.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
All the contracts are immutable
90%
Description relates to investments safety in clear non-software language
30%
Description all in software-specific language
0%
No admin control information could be found

23. Is there sufficient Pause Control documentation? (%)

Answer: 80%

This protocol's pause control is documented and well explained in this location. There is no evidence of testing. Pause capacities are clearly explained.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
If immutable and no changes possible
100%
If admin control is fully via governance
80%
Robust transaction signing process (7 or more elements)
70%
Adequate transaction signing process (5 or more elements)
60%
Weak transaction signing process (3 or more elements)
0%
No transaction signing process evident
Evidence of audits of signers following the process add 20%

24. Is there sufficient Timelock documentation? (%)

Answer: 100%

This protocol has timelock documentation which can be found at this location. A duration is specified and the contracts dependent are identified.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Documentation identifies and explains why the protocol does not need a Timelock OR Timelock documentation identifies its duration, which contracts it applies to and justifies this time period.
60%
A Timelock is identified and its duration is specified
30%
A Timelock is identified
0%
No Timelock information was documented

25. Is the Timelock of an adequate length? (Y/N)

Answer: 100%

The timelock is of a relevant length, as specified in this location.

Percentage Score Guidance:
100%
Timelock is between 48 hours to 1 week OR justification as to why no Timelock is needed / is outside this length.
50%
Timelock is less than 48 hours or greater than 1 week.
0%
No Timelock information was documented OR no timelock length was identified.

Oracles

63%

This section goes over the documentation that a protocol may or may not supply about their Oracle usage. Oracles are a fundamental part of DeFi as they are responsible for relaying tons of price data information to thousands of protocols using blockchain technology. Not only are they important for price feeds, but they are also an essential component of transaction verification and security. This is explained in this document.

26. Is the protocol's Oracle sufficiently documented? (%)

Answer: 50

Venus's oracle is not documented. There is no information in the documentation relating to where Venus gets its price feeds. However, there is a blog post that details that Venus uses Chainlink, though there is no software function documentation explaining this.

Score Guidance:
100%
If it uses one, the Oracle is specified. The contracts dependent on the oracle are identified. Basic software functions are identified (if the protocol provides its own price feed data). Timeframe of price feeds are identified. OR The reason as to why the protocol does not use an Oracle is identified and explained.
75%
The Oracle documentation identifies both source and timeframe, but does not provide additional context regarding smart contracts.
50%
Only the Oracle source is identified.
0%
No oracle is named / no oracle information is documented.

27. Is front running mitigated by this protocol? (Y/N)

Answer: No

Venus documents no front running mitigation techniques.

Score Guidance:
Yes
The protocol cannot be front run and there is an explanation as to why OR documented front running countermeasures are implemented.
No
The Oracle documentation identifies both source and timeframe, but does not provide additional context regarding smart contracts.

28. Can flashloan attacks be applied to the protocol, and if so, are those flashloan attack risks mitigated? (Y/N)

Answer: Yes

This protocol documents flashloan countermeasures. Venus uses Chainlink, which prevents oracle price manipulation and therefore ensures no flashloans attacks can be used on this protocol.

Score Guidance:
Yes
The protocol's documentation includes information on how they mitigate the possibilities and extents of flash loan attacks.
No
The protocol's documentation does not include any information regarding the mitigation of flash loan attacks.

Appendices

1pragma solidity ^0.5.16;
2
3import "./VToken.sol";
4import "./PriceOracle.sol";
5import "./ErrorReporter.sol";
6import "./Exponential.sol";
7import "./VAIControllerStorage.sol";
8import "./VAIUnitroller.sol";
9import "./VAI/VAI.sol";
10
11interface ComptrollerImplInterface {
12    function protocolPaused() external view returns (bool);
13    function mintedVAIs(address account) external view returns (uint);
14    function vaiMintRate() external view returns (uint);
15    function venusVAIRate() external view returns (uint);
16    function venusAccrued(address account) external view returns(uint);
17    function getAssetsIn(address account) external view returns (VToken[] memory);
18    function oracle() external view returns (PriceOracle);
19}
20
21/**
22 * @title Venus's VAI Comptroller Contract
23 * @author Venus
24 */
25contract VAIController is VAIControllerStorageG2, VAIControllerErrorReporter, Exponential {
26
27    /// @notice Emitted when Comptroller is changed
28    event NewComptroller(ComptrollerInterface oldComptroller, ComptrollerInterface newComptroller);
29
30    /**
31     * @notice Event emitted when VAI is minted
32     */
33    event MintVAI(address minter, uint mintVAIAmount);
34
35    /**
36     * @notice Event emitted when VAI is repaid
37     */
38    event RepayVAI(address payer, address borrower, uint repayVAIAmount);
39
40    /// @notice The initial Venus index for a market
41    uint224 public constant venusInitialIndex = 1e36;
42
43    /**
44     * @notice Event emitted when a borrow is liquidated
45     */
46    event LiquidateVAI(address liquidator, address borrower, uint repayAmount, address vTokenCollateral, uint seizeTokens);
47
48    /**
49     * @notice Emitted when treasury guardian is changed
50     */
51    event NewTreasuryGuardian(address oldTreasuryGuardian, address newTreasuryGuardian);
52
53    /**
54     * @notice Emitted when treasury address is changed
55     */
56    event NewTreasuryAddress(address oldTreasuryAddress, address newTreasuryAddress);
57
58    /**
59     * @notice Emitted when treasury percent is changed
60     */
61    event NewTreasuryPercent(uint oldTreasuryPercent, uint newTreasuryPercent);
62
63    /**
64     * @notice Event emitted when VAIs are minted and fee are transferred
65     */
66    event MintFee(address minter, uint feeAmount);
67
68    /*** Main Actions ***/
69    struct MintLocalVars {
70        uint oErr;
71        MathError mathErr;
72        uint mintAmount;
73        uint accountMintVAINew;
74        uint accountMintableVAI;
75    }
76
77    function mintVAI(uint mintVAIAmount) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
78        if(address(comptroller) != address(0)) {
79            require(mintVAIAmount > 0, "mintVAIAmount cannt be zero");
80
81            require(!ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).protocolPaused(), "protocol is paused");
82
83            MintLocalVars memory vars;
84
85            address minter = msg.sender;
86
87            (vars.oErr, vars.accountMintableVAI) = getMintableVAI(minter);
88            if (vars.oErr != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
89                return uint(Error.REJECTION);
90            }
91
92            // check that user have sufficient mintableVAI balance
93            if (mintVAIAmount > vars.accountMintableVAI) {
94                return fail(Error.REJECTION, FailureInfo.VAI_MINT_REJECTION);
95            }
96
97            (vars.mathErr, vars.accountMintVAINew) = addUInt(ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).mintedVAIs(minter), mintVAIAmount);
98            require(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "VAI_MINT_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED");
99            uint error = comptroller.setMintedVAIOf(minter, vars.accountMintVAINew);
100            if (error != 0 ) {
101                return error;
102            }
103
104            uint feeAmount;
105            uint remainedAmount;
106            vars.mintAmount = mintVAIAmount;
107            if (treasuryPercent != 0) {
108                (vars.mathErr, feeAmount) = mulUInt(vars.mintAmount, treasuryPercent);
109                if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
110                    return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_FEE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
111                }
112
113                (vars.mathErr, feeAmount) = divUInt(feeAmount, 1e18);
114                if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
115                    return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_FEE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
116                }
117
118                (vars.mathErr, remainedAmount) = subUInt(vars.mintAmount, feeAmount);
119                if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
120                    return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_FEE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
121                }
122
123                VAI(getVAIAddress()).mint(treasuryAddress, feeAmount);
124
125                emit MintFee(minter, feeAmount);
126            } else {
127                remainedAmount = vars.mintAmount;
128            }
129
130            VAI(getVAIAddress()).mint(minter, remainedAmount);
131
132            emit MintVAI(minter, remainedAmount);
133
134            return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
135        }
136    }
137
138    /**
139     * @notice Repay VAI
140     */
141    function repayVAI(uint repayVAIAmount) external nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
142        if(address(comptroller) != address(0)) {
143            require(repayVAIAmount > 0, "repayVAIAmount cannt be zero");
144
145            require(!ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).protocolPaused(), "protocol is paused");
146
147            address payer = msg.sender;
148
149            return repayVAIFresh(msg.sender, msg.sender, repayVAIAmount);
150        }
151    }
152
153    /**
154     * @notice Repay VAI Internal
155     * @notice Borrowed VAIs are repaid by another user (possibly the borrower).
156     * @param payer the account paying off the VAI
157     * @param borrower the account with the debt being payed off
158     * @param repayAmount the amount of VAI being returned
159     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
160     */
161    function repayVAIFresh(address payer, address borrower, uint repayAmount) internal returns (uint, uint) {
162        uint actualBurnAmount;
163
164        uint vaiBalanceBorrower = ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).mintedVAIs(borrower);
165
166        if(vaiBalanceBorrower > repayAmount) {
167            actualBurnAmount = repayAmount;
168        } else {
169            actualBurnAmount = vaiBalanceBorrower;
170        }
171
172        MathError mErr;
173        uint accountVAINew;
174
175        VAI(getVAIAddress()).burn(payer, actualBurnAmount);
176
177        (mErr, accountVAINew) = subUInt(vaiBalanceBorrower, actualBurnAmount);
178        require(mErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "VAI_BURN_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED");
179
180        uint error = comptroller.setMintedVAIOf(borrower, accountVAINew);
181        if (error != 0) {
182            return (error, 0);
183        }
184        emit RepayVAI(payer, borrower, actualBurnAmount);
185
186        return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), actualBurnAmount);
187    }
188
189    /**
190     * @notice The sender liquidates the vai minters collateral.
191     *  The collateral seized is transferred to the liquidator.
192     * @param borrower The borrower of vai to be liquidated
193     * @param vTokenCollateral The market in which to seize collateral from the borrower
194     * @param repayAmount The amount of the underlying borrowed asset to repay
195     * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
196     */
197    function liquidateVAI(address borrower, uint repayAmount, VTokenInterface vTokenCollateral) external nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
198        require(!ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).protocolPaused(), "protocol is paused");
199
200        uint error = vTokenCollateral.accrueInterest();
201        if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
202            // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted liquidation failed
203            return (fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.VAI_LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_COLLATERAL_INTEREST_FAILED), 0);
204        }
205
206        // liquidateVAIFresh emits borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
207        return liquidateVAIFresh(msg.sender, borrower, repayAmount, vTokenCollateral);
208    }
209

JavaScript Tests

Language
Files
Lines
Blanks
Comments
Testing Code
Deployed Code
Complexity
Solidity
72
21424
3353
6259
13115
11612
2120

Tests to Code: 13115 / 11612 = 113 %