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PASS
The final review score is indicated as a percentage. The percentage is calculated as Achieved Points due to MAX Possible Points. For each element the answer can be either Yes/No or a percentage. For a detailed breakdown of the individual weights of each question, please consult this document.
Very simply, the audit looks for the following declarations from the developer's site. With these declarations, it is reasonable to trust the smart contracts.
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice of any kind, nor does it constitute an offer to provide investment advisory or other services. Nothing in this report shall be considered a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security, token, future, option or other financial instrument or to offer or provide any investment advice or service to any person in any jurisdiction. Nothing contained in this report constitutes investment advice or offers any opinion with respect to the suitability of any security, and the views expressed in this report should not be taken as advice to buy, sell or hold any security. The information in this report should not be relied upon for the purpose of investing. In preparing the information contained in this report, we have not taken into account the investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances of any particular investor. This information has no regard to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs of any specific recipient of this information and investments discussed may not be suitable for all investors.
Any views expressed in this report by us were prepared based upon the information available to us at the time such views were written. The views expressed within this report are limited to DeFiSafety and the author and do not reflect those of any additional or third party and are strictly based upon DeFiSafety, its authors, interpretations and evaluation of relevant data. Changed or additional information could cause such views to change. All information is subject to possible correction. Information may quickly become unreliable for various reasons, including changes in market conditions or economic circumstances.
This completed report is copyright (c) DeFiSafety 2023. Permission is given to copy in whole, retaining this copyright label.
This section looks at the code deployed on the relevant chain that gets reviewed and its corresponding software repository. The document explaining these questions is here.
1. Are the smart contract addresses easy to find? (%)
They can be found at https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-config , as indicated in the Appendix. This is quickly found via documentation.
2. How active is the primary contract? (%)
Contract Unitroller is used substantially more than 10 times a day, as indicated in the Appendix.
3. Does the protocol have a public software repository? (Y/N)
Location: https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol
4. Is there a development history visible? (%)
At 360 commits, this development history has surpassed going to the moon and is currently orbiting Venus.
5. Is the team public (not anonymous)?
Public team members can be found in the GitHub repo as well as on the blog. They confirm working either on Venus or with Swipe, the team behind Venus.
The difference between this and the old link is solely the link. This section looks at the software documentation. The document explaining these questions is here.
6. Is there a whitepaper? (Y/N)
Location: https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol/blob/master/docs/VenusWhitepaper.pdf
7. Is the protocol's software architecture documented? (Y/N)
This protocol's software architecture is documented in good detail.
8. Does the software documentation fully cover the deployed contracts' source code? (%)
There is complete coverage of deployed contracts by software function documentation.
9. Is it possible to trace the documented software to its implementation in the protocol's source code? (%)
There is implicit traceability between software documentation and implemented code. Without direct links to code location in the GitHub repo, this link is associational.
10. Has the protocol tested their deployed code? (%)
Code examples are in the Appendix at the end of this report.. As per the SLOC, there is 113% testing to code (TtC). This score is guided by the Test to Code ratio (TtC). Generally a good test to code ratio is over 100%. However, the reviewer's best judgement is the final deciding factor.
11. How covered is the protocol's code? (%)
There is no documented testing for code coverage but with such a high TtC there is evidence of good test coverage.
12. Does the protocol provide scripts and instructions to run their tests? (Y/N)
Scripts/Instructions location: https://github.com/VenusProtocol/venus-protocol
13. Is there a detailed report of the protocol's test results?(%)
Venus documents a test report. Link
14. Has the protocol undergone Formal Verification? (Y/N)
This protocol has not undergone formal verification. While they mention they have done this in their documentation, the link they provide is dead.
15. Were the smart contracts deployed to a testnet? (Y/N)
Venus has documented a deployment to a testnet. These contracts can be verified using BSCScan's testnet feature.
This section looks at the 3rd party software audits done. It is explained in this document.
16. Is the protocol sufficiently audited? (%)
Venus was audited once before deployment. The auditing firm was CertiK.
17. Is the bounty value acceptably high (%)
Venus does not offer a bug bounty program.
This section covers the documentation of special access controls for a DeFi protocol. The admin access controls are the contracts that allow updating contracts or coefficients in the protocol. Since these contracts can allow the protocol admins to "change the rules", complete disclosure of capabilities is vital for user's transparency. It is explained in this document.
18. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to find?
Admin control information was documented in the form of governance information at this location. This was quick to find.
19. Are relevant contracts clearly labelled as upgradeable or immutable? (%)
The relevant contracts are not identified as immutable / upgradeable.
20. Is the type of smart contract ownership clearly indicated? (%)
Ownership is clearly indicated in this location. It is in the hands of XVS holders who can vote / delegate their vote.
21. Are the protocol's smart contract change capabilities described? (%)
Smart contract change capabilities are not clearly identified in any contracts. While votes are specified as possible to occur, it is not clear what the votes parameters are.
22. Is the protocol's admin control information easy to understand? (%)
This information is in completely software specific language.
23. Is there sufficient Pause Control documentation? (%)
This protocol's pause control is documented and well explained in this location. There is no evidence of testing. Pause capacities are clearly explained.
24. Is there sufficient Timelock documentation? (%)
This protocol has timelock documentation which can be found at this location. A duration is specified and the contracts dependent are identified.
25. Is the Timelock of an adequate length? (Y/N)
The timelock is of a relevant length, as specified in this location.
This section goes over the documentation that a protocol may or may not supply about their Oracle usage. Oracles are a fundamental part of DeFi as they are responsible for relaying tons of price data information to thousands of protocols using blockchain technology. Not only are they important for price feeds, but they are also an essential component of transaction verification and security. This is explained in this document.
26. Is the protocol's Oracle sufficiently documented? (%)
Venus's oracle is not documented. There is no information in the documentation relating to where Venus gets its price feeds. However, there is a blog post that details that Venus uses Chainlink, though there is no software function documentation explaining this.
27. Is front running mitigated by this protocol? (Y/N)
Venus documents no front running mitigation techniques.
28. Can flashloan attacks be applied to the protocol, and if so, are those flashloan attack risks mitigated? (Y/N)
This protocol documents flashloan countermeasures. Venus uses Chainlink, which prevents oracle price manipulation and therefore ensures no flashloans attacks can be used on this protocol.
1pragma solidity ^0.5.16;
2
3import "./VToken.sol";
4import "./PriceOracle.sol";
5import "./ErrorReporter.sol";
6import "./Exponential.sol";
7import "./VAIControllerStorage.sol";
8import "./VAIUnitroller.sol";
9import "./VAI/VAI.sol";
10
11interface ComptrollerImplInterface {
12 function protocolPaused() external view returns (bool);
13 function mintedVAIs(address account) external view returns (uint);
14 function vaiMintRate() external view returns (uint);
15 function venusVAIRate() external view returns (uint);
16 function venusAccrued(address account) external view returns(uint);
17 function getAssetsIn(address account) external view returns (VToken[] memory);
18 function oracle() external view returns (PriceOracle);
19}
20
21/**
22 * @title Venus's VAI Comptroller Contract
23 * @author Venus
24 */
25contract VAIController is VAIControllerStorageG2, VAIControllerErrorReporter, Exponential {
26
27 /// @notice Emitted when Comptroller is changed
28 event NewComptroller(ComptrollerInterface oldComptroller, ComptrollerInterface newComptroller);
29
30 /**
31 * @notice Event emitted when VAI is minted
32 */
33 event MintVAI(address minter, uint mintVAIAmount);
34
35 /**
36 * @notice Event emitted when VAI is repaid
37 */
38 event RepayVAI(address payer, address borrower, uint repayVAIAmount);
39
40 /// @notice The initial Venus index for a market
41 uint224 public constant venusInitialIndex = 1e36;
42
43 /**
44 * @notice Event emitted when a borrow is liquidated
45 */
46 event LiquidateVAI(address liquidator, address borrower, uint repayAmount, address vTokenCollateral, uint seizeTokens);
47
48 /**
49 * @notice Emitted when treasury guardian is changed
50 */
51 event NewTreasuryGuardian(address oldTreasuryGuardian, address newTreasuryGuardian);
52
53 /**
54 * @notice Emitted when treasury address is changed
55 */
56 event NewTreasuryAddress(address oldTreasuryAddress, address newTreasuryAddress);
57
58 /**
59 * @notice Emitted when treasury percent is changed
60 */
61 event NewTreasuryPercent(uint oldTreasuryPercent, uint newTreasuryPercent);
62
63 /**
64 * @notice Event emitted when VAIs are minted and fee are transferred
65 */
66 event MintFee(address minter, uint feeAmount);
67
68 /*** Main Actions ***/
69 struct MintLocalVars {
70 uint oErr;
71 MathError mathErr;
72 uint mintAmount;
73 uint accountMintVAINew;
74 uint accountMintableVAI;
75 }
76
77 function mintVAI(uint mintVAIAmount) external nonReentrant returns (uint) {
78 if(address(comptroller) != address(0)) {
79 require(mintVAIAmount > 0, "mintVAIAmount cannt be zero");
80
81 require(!ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).protocolPaused(), "protocol is paused");
82
83 MintLocalVars memory vars;
84
85 address minter = msg.sender;
86
87 (vars.oErr, vars.accountMintableVAI) = getMintableVAI(minter);
88 if (vars.oErr != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
89 return uint(Error.REJECTION);
90 }
91
92 // check that user have sufficient mintableVAI balance
93 if (mintVAIAmount > vars.accountMintableVAI) {
94 return fail(Error.REJECTION, FailureInfo.VAI_MINT_REJECTION);
95 }
96
97 (vars.mathErr, vars.accountMintVAINew) = addUInt(ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).mintedVAIs(minter), mintVAIAmount);
98 require(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "VAI_MINT_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED");
99 uint error = comptroller.setMintedVAIOf(minter, vars.accountMintVAINew);
100 if (error != 0 ) {
101 return error;
102 }
103
104 uint feeAmount;
105 uint remainedAmount;
106 vars.mintAmount = mintVAIAmount;
107 if (treasuryPercent != 0) {
108 (vars.mathErr, feeAmount) = mulUInt(vars.mintAmount, treasuryPercent);
109 if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
110 return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_FEE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
111 }
112
113 (vars.mathErr, feeAmount) = divUInt(feeAmount, 1e18);
114 if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
115 return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_FEE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
116 }
117
118 (vars.mathErr, remainedAmount) = subUInt(vars.mintAmount, feeAmount);
119 if (vars.mathErr != MathError.NO_ERROR) {
120 return failOpaque(Error.MATH_ERROR, FailureInfo.MINT_FEE_CALCULATION_FAILED, uint(vars.mathErr));
121 }
122
123 VAI(getVAIAddress()).mint(treasuryAddress, feeAmount);
124
125 emit MintFee(minter, feeAmount);
126 } else {
127 remainedAmount = vars.mintAmount;
128 }
129
130 VAI(getVAIAddress()).mint(minter, remainedAmount);
131
132 emit MintVAI(minter, remainedAmount);
133
134 return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
135 }
136 }
137
138 /**
139 * @notice Repay VAI
140 */
141 function repayVAI(uint repayVAIAmount) external nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
142 if(address(comptroller) != address(0)) {
143 require(repayVAIAmount > 0, "repayVAIAmount cannt be zero");
144
145 require(!ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).protocolPaused(), "protocol is paused");
146
147 address payer = msg.sender;
148
149 return repayVAIFresh(msg.sender, msg.sender, repayVAIAmount);
150 }
151 }
152
153 /**
154 * @notice Repay VAI Internal
155 * @notice Borrowed VAIs are repaid by another user (possibly the borrower).
156 * @param payer the account paying off the VAI
157 * @param borrower the account with the debt being payed off
158 * @param repayAmount the amount of VAI being returned
159 * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
160 */
161 function repayVAIFresh(address payer, address borrower, uint repayAmount) internal returns (uint, uint) {
162 uint actualBurnAmount;
163
164 uint vaiBalanceBorrower = ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).mintedVAIs(borrower);
165
166 if(vaiBalanceBorrower > repayAmount) {
167 actualBurnAmount = repayAmount;
168 } else {
169 actualBurnAmount = vaiBalanceBorrower;
170 }
171
172 MathError mErr;
173 uint accountVAINew;
174
175 VAI(getVAIAddress()).burn(payer, actualBurnAmount);
176
177 (mErr, accountVAINew) = subUInt(vaiBalanceBorrower, actualBurnAmount);
178 require(mErr == MathError.NO_ERROR, "VAI_BURN_AMOUNT_CALCULATION_FAILED");
179
180 uint error = comptroller.setMintedVAIOf(borrower, accountVAINew);
181 if (error != 0) {
182 return (error, 0);
183 }
184 emit RepayVAI(payer, borrower, actualBurnAmount);
185
186 return (uint(Error.NO_ERROR), actualBurnAmount);
187 }
188
189 /**
190 * @notice The sender liquidates the vai minters collateral.
191 * The collateral seized is transferred to the liquidator.
192 * @param borrower The borrower of vai to be liquidated
193 * @param vTokenCollateral The market in which to seize collateral from the borrower
194 * @param repayAmount The amount of the underlying borrowed asset to repay
195 * @return (uint, uint) An error code (0=success, otherwise a failure, see ErrorReporter.sol), and the actual repayment amount.
196 */
197 function liquidateVAI(address borrower, uint repayAmount, VTokenInterface vTokenCollateral) external nonReentrant returns (uint, uint) {
198 require(!ComptrollerImplInterface(address(comptroller)).protocolPaused(), "protocol is paused");
199
200 uint error = vTokenCollateral.accrueInterest();
201 if (error != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
202 // accrueInterest emits logs on errors, but we still want to log the fact that an attempted liquidation failed
203 return (fail(Error(error), FailureInfo.VAI_LIQUIDATE_ACCRUE_COLLATERAL_INTEREST_FAILED), 0);
204 }
205
206 // liquidateVAIFresh emits borrow-specific logs on errors, so we don't need to
207 return liquidateVAIFresh(msg.sender, borrower, repayAmount, vTokenCollateral);
208 }
209
Tests to Code: 13115 / 11612 = 113 %